No Child Left Unprotected: Adopting the Ninth Circuit\u27s Interpretation of the Child Status Protection Act in De Osorio v. Mayorkas by Milner, Dianne
Cornell International Law Journal
Volume 46
Issue 3 Fall 2013 Article 6
No Child Left Unprotected: Adopting the Ninth
Circuit's Interpretation of the Child Status
Protection Act in De Osorio v. Mayorkas
Dianne Milner
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell International Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Milner, Dianne (2013) "No Child Left Unprotected: Adopting the Ninth Circuit's Interpretation of the Child Status Protection Act in
De Osorio v. Mayorkas," Cornell International Law Journal: Vol. 46: Iss. 3, Article 6.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol46/iss3/6
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\46-3\CIN306.txt unknown Seq: 1  8-JAN-14 14:08
No Child Left Unprotected: Adopting
the Ninth Circuit’s Interpretation of
the Child Status Protection Act in
De Osorio v. Mayorkas
Dianne Milner†
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 683 R
I. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 687 R
A. Family-Sponsored Immigration Policies & Procedures . . 687 R
1. Immigration and Nationality Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 687 R
2. Child Status Protection Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 689 R
B. The Split Among the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals . . . . 692 R
1. Board of Immigration Appeals Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 692 R
2. Second Circuit Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 693 R
3. Fifth Circuit Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 695 R
4. Ninth Circuit Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 697 R
II. The Supreme Court Should Adopt the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits’ Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 698 R
A. The Second Circuit’s Interpretation Leads to Absurd
Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 698 R
B. Subsection (h)(3) Benefits Apply to All Family-
Sponsored Visa Petitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 702 R
1. Chevron Deference Does Not Apply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 702 R
2. The Plain Language of the Statute Dictates the Proper
Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 704 R
C. Policy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 705 R
III. EU Family-Sponsored Immigration Policies and
Procedures: A Comparative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 705 R
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 709 R
Introduction
Government officials and scholars agree that family reunification is a
“cornerstone” of U.S. immigration law.1  Many aliens immigrate legally to
† Candidate for J.D. at Cornell Law School, 2014.  I would like to thank the
Honorable George D. Marlow for inspiring me to write this Note and Josh Peary, Patricia
Ciccone, and Mariel Milner for their guidance and input during the writing process.
1. Monique Lee Hawthorne, Family Unity in Immigration Law: Broadening the Scope
of “Family,” 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 809, 810 (2007); Patricia Hatch, U.S. Immigration
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the United States each year; however, the current system for reunifying U.S.
citizens and lawful permanent residents (LPRs) with their alien relatives
through family-sponsored visas is anything but swift.2  Under the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act (INA),3 passed in 1952, U.S. citizens and LPRs can
file visa petitions on behalf of certain “qualifying alien relatives”4 to enable
their family member’s immigration to the United States.5  The United
States permits an unlimited number of visas for the children, spouses, and
parents of adult U.S. citizens, but subjects the remaining qualifying alien
relatives to a quota system.6  Under the INA, an alien seeking to immigrate
to the United States on the basis of a family-sponsored visa petition may
also obtain a visa for his or her child if the child is accompanying or “fol-
lowing to join” the alien.7  The INA designates such a child as a “derivative
beneficiary” of the alien parent’s visa petition.8
Aliens seeking to immigrate to the United States are further restricted
because “no more than seven percent of the worldwide allotments for
visas . . . may be made available during any fiscal year to the natives of a
single foreign state.”9  The United States does not adjust these per-country
limits to take into account countries with large populations, countries that
are geographically adjacent to the United States, or countries that histori-
cally send large numbers of immigrants to the United States.10  As a result,
countries with these characteristics have extremely long waiting times.11
Each month, the U.S. State Department Bureau of Consular Affairs issues a
Visa Bulletin listing the cut-off dates that govern family-sponsored visa
Policy: Family Reunification, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.lwv.
org/files/ImmigrationStudy_FamilyReunification_Hatch.pdf; Three Decades of Mass
Immigration: The Legacy of the 1965 Immigration Act, CENTER. FOR IMMIGR. STUDIES (Sept.
1995), http://www.cis.org/1965ImmigrationAct-MassImmigration.
2. See infra note 11. R
3. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101– 1537 (2006).
4. De Osorio v. Mayorkas, 695 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 2012). (en banc), rev’g on
reh’g, 656 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2011).
5. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a).
6. See Amber J. Tafoya, Family-Based Immigration: Answers to Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, 35 COLO. LAW. 47, 49 (2006).
7. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(d).
8. De Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1008 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(2)(B)).
9. CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 31.02[3][a] (Mat-
thew Bender ed., 2012) (citing 8 U.S.C. §?1152(a)(2), as amended by the Immigration
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, §?102, 104 Stat. 4978). The original language of the
INA called for a national origins quota system, but concerns about discrimination on
the basis of race, sex, nationality, place of birth, and place of residence led Congress to
repeal this quota system in 1965. GORDON, supra, § 2.04[3].
10. Bernard Trujillo, Immigrant Visa Distribution: The Case of Mexico, 2000 WIS. L.
REV. 713, 715 (2000) (noting that Luxembourg has the same visa ceiling as China and
Mexico).
11. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, VISA BULLETIN, 1– 2 (2013),
available at http://travel.state.gov/visa/bulletin/bulletin_5993.html.  Visa demand
exceeds the per-country limits for China (Mainland), India, Mexico, and the Philippines;
as a result, these countries have separate, individualized priority dates for each of the
five family-sponsored visa categories. Id.  As of July 2013, Filipino siblings of U.S. citi-
zens experience the largest backlog; they are only eligible for immigrant numbers if they
have priority dates earlier than December 15, 1989. Id.
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availability for various countries.12  Only applicants with priority dates
earlier than the cut-off date are given a number for an available visa.13
With cut-off dates that span from the years 1989 to 2011, even aliens who
fulfill all the requirements of a family-sponsored visa petition face
extremely long wait times.14  Unfortunately, these wait times may prove to
be even longer for certain children who were originally listed as derivative
beneficiaries of their parents’ family-sponsored visa petitions.  According
to the INA, a child can only be a derivative beneficiary of a visa petition if
he or she is under the age of twenty-one.15  If this child turns twenty-one
before his or her parent’s visa petition is granted, the child is considered to
have “aged out” of derivative beneficiary status.16  As a result, the twenty-
one-year-old child would have to find a new preference category that
applies to him or her.17
In an attempt to aid children facing this dilemma, Congress passed the
Child Status Protection Act (CSPA)18 in 2002 to enable aged-out derivative
beneficiaries to retain the priority date of their parent’s original applica-
tion.19  Despite this legislation, aging out continues to be a controversial
issue.20  On September 26, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, on a rehearing en banc, in De Osorio v. Mayorkas, reversed a deci-
sion rendered just one year earlier by its own three-judge panel.21  The
original panel denied priority date retention to a young man who had
already waited seven years in line for a visa before aging out of derivative
beneficiary status the same year that his mother’s visa petition was
granted.22  Other U.S. courts, most notably the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, have also denied priority date retention to similarly
situated individuals.23
On June 24, 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari in De Osorio v. Mayorkas, signaling that a resolution of this cir-
cuit split is likely near.24  The Court’s grant of certiorari came just after the
Executive and Legislative branches also publicly committed to reforming
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1.
14. Id. at 1– 2.
15. Tafoya, supra note 6, at 48 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(2006)). R
16. Id.
17. See id.
18. Child Status Protection Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006).
19. See infra pp. 689– 692.
20. Scott Graham, Judges Split 6-5 Over Meaning of Immigration Provision, RECORDER
(Sept. 26, 2012, 3:02 PM), http://www.law.com/jsp/ca/PubArticleFriendlyCA.jsp?id=
1202572784891.
21. Id. (noting that the majority was completely composed of Democratic judges,
three of whom had at least one parent who was born in Mexico).
22. See infra pp. 701– 702.
23. Li v. Renaud, 654 F.3d 376, 385 (2d Cir. 2011).
24. Order of the Supreme Court of the United States of June 24, 2013, at 6, available
at http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/062413zor_n7ip.pdf (granting
cert. in De Osorio v. Mayorkas, 695 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2012)).
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the immigration system in the United States.25  Earlier in June, President
Obama endorsed the “Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immi-
gration Modernization Act” (also known as the Comprehensive Immigra-
tion Reform (CIR) bill), which was introduced in the Senate in April
2013.26  The Senate subsequently passed the CIR bill “with a strong major-
ity” on June 27, 2013.27  If the House of Representatives passes the bill in
its current form, it would, among other things, “make significant changes
[to] the existing family-based immigration preference system.”28  In partic-
ular, it would amend the INA and CSPA to ensure that children who age
out of derivative beneficiary status maintain the priority date of the origi-
nal petition filed on their behalf.29
From an international perspective, a resolution of this split is neces-
sary to inform potential immigrants around the world about what they can
expect if they apply for a U.S. visa.  The United States is currently in a
unique position among developed countries with large numbers of immi-
grants, especially when compared to those in Europe.  This is true for two
reasons.  First, the United States has the largest number of immigrants of
any developed nation.30  Second, unlike a majority of such developed
nations, it is not a member of the European Union (EU).31  As a suprana-
tional organization, the EU sets baseline requirements for all policies,
including family reunification policies, which immigrants to the EU can
fall back on if the legislation of the particular country to which they are
immigrating is unclear.32  In the United States, the lack of such a fallback
25. See Elise Foley, Obama on Immigration Bill: This is the Vehicle to Fix Broken Sys-
tem, HUFFINGTON POST (June 11, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/11/
obama-immigration_n_3421342.html.
26. Id.; Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization
Act, S. 744, 113th Cong. (as passed by Senate, June 27, 2013); Carl Shusterman, CIR Bill
Would Create New Family-Based System, CARL SHUSTERMAN’S IMMIGR. UPDATE (Apr. 22,
2013, 1:58 PM), http://blogs.ilw.com/carlshusterman/2013/04/cir-bill-would-create-
new-family-based-system.html.
27. Elise Foley, Senate Immigration Reform Bill Passes with Strong Majority, HUF-
FINGTON POST (June 27, 2013, 4:22 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/27/
senate-immigration-reform-bill_n_3511664.html.
28. Shusterman, supra note 26. R
29. See S. 744, § 2305(d).
30. Immigrants by Citizenship and Age, OECD, http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?
r=866020 (last visited June 14, 2013). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) is traditionally considered to be an organization of developed
countries, as evidenced by its founding instrument, which states, “believing that the
economically more advanced nations should co-operate in assisting to the best of their
ability the countries in process of economic development.”  Convention on the Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development, Dec. 14, 1960, 12 U.S.T. 1728, 1729,
1961 WL 62596.
31. See Members and Partners, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/membersand
partners/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2013) (listing the 34 current member countries of the
OECD, 22 of which are EU member states).
32. See Application of EU Law, EUR. COMMISSION (June 25, 2012), http://ec.europa.
eu/eu_law/introduction/what_directive_en.htm (describing EU directives as instru-
ments that lay out the end results each Member State is required to achieve, but that
allow national authorities discretion to decide how to adapt laws to achieve those end
results).
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provision means that the future of family reunification will hang in the
balance until the current circuit split is resolved.
This Note analyzes the recent decisions of three U.S. Circuit Courts of
Appeals, which have split over the interpretation of the language of the
CSPA.  In particular, it focuses on whether the priority date retention and
automatic conversion benefits mentioned in the CSPA extend to aged-out
derivative beneficiaries of all family visa petitions described in subsection
(h)(2) of the CSPA, even if there is a change in the petitioner who sponsors
the derivative beneficiary after he or she ages out.  This Note contends that
in deciding De Osorio v. Mayorkas, the Supreme Court should adopt the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits’ interpretation, permitting automatic conversion
and priority date retention to extend to aged-out derivative beneficiaries of
all family visa petitions because the statute is unambiguous and because its
plain language demands this result.  The Supreme Court should not adopt
the Second Circuit’s interpretation because it leads to absurd results, par-
ticularly when analyzed in conjunction with the new immigration policy of
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) enacted by the Obama
administration.
Part I of this Note explains the relevant statutes and case law involved
in the current circuit split.  It begins with explanations of the INA, the basic
body of law governing U.S. immigration law, and the CSPA, an amendment
that clarified certain INA provisions, followed by summaries of the judicial
decisions that produced the split.  Part II suggests how the Supreme Court
should resolve the split.  Part III compares the family-sponsored immigra-
tion policies and procedures of the United States and the European Union,
particularly as they pertain to unmarried children over a certain age.
I. Background
The U.S. Constitution vests in Congress the power to establish rules
for naturalization,33 the process by which foreign-born individuals can
acquire U.S. citizenship.34  The first naturalization statute, passed in 1790,
established the fundamental substantive qualifications for naturalization,
and is, for the most part, still in effect.35  Since then, Congress has modi-
fied and adapted naturalization laws with numerous statutes and amend-
ments.36  This Part summarizes the two major statutes governing family-
sponsored immigration in the United States today as well as the three cases
that have produced a circuit split over the interpretation of these statutes.
A. Family-Sponsored Immigration Policies & Procedures
1. Immigration and Nationality Act
The INA provides the basic structure for U.S. immigration law,37
33. GORDON, ET AL., supra note 9, § 94.01[1] (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4). R
34. Id.; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1126 (9th ed. 2009).
35. GORDON, ET AL., supra note 9, § 94.01, ¶ 2(a). R
36. Id.
37. Li v. Renaud, 654 F.3d 376, 377 (2d Cir. 2011).
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including (1) “a worldwide limitation on the total number of family-spon-
sored immigrant visas issued each year,”38 (2) “preference categories for
certain types of family members of citizens and LPRs,”39 (3) “numerical
limitations on the number of family-sponsored immigrant visas to be
issued in each family preference category,”40 and (4) a limitation that
natives of any single country shall “not constitute more than 7% of the
visas granted to family-sponsored immigrants.”41  In order to qualify for
naturalization under the INA, a person must be at least eighteen years old,
attain LPR status, and reside continuously in the United States for five
years after becoming an LPR.42  Despite this age requirement, the INA pro-
vides that a child whose parents naturalize will also naturalize.43
Obtaining LPR status requires an immigrant to have a “qualifying family
relationship,” meaning that he or she must have a family member who is
either a U.S. citizen or an LPR of the United States.44  To initiate the pro-
cess of obtaining LPR status, the citizen or LPR family member in the
United States (the petitioner) must file a petition with the U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services (USCIS) on behalf of the intending immigrant
family member (the beneficiary) to establish that the qualifying relation-
ship exists.45
There are five recognized categories of qualifying family relationships:
(1) spouse; (2) child; (3) son or daughter;46 (4) parent; and (5) brother or
sister.47  However, only spouses, children, and parents of U.S. citizens are
considered to be “immediate relatives.”48  This is relevant because petitions
by U.S. citizens on behalf of their immediate relatives are not subject to the
quota system; therefore, individuals falling into this category do not have to
wait to obtain an immigrant visa.49  However, all non-immediate relatives
of U.S. citizens, as well as spouses, children, and parents of LPRs, are sub-
ject to the quota system, and visa wait times for these individuals are deter-
mined by preference category.50  Subsections (a)(1)– (4) of the INA
describe the four preference categories of family-sponsored immigrants.51
The first preference category (F1) consists of unmarried sons and daugh-
ters of U.S. citizens.52  The second preference category consists of two sub-
categories: spouses and children of LPRs (F2A) and unmarried sons and
38. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1151(c) (2006)).
39. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)).
40. Id.
41. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. §1152(a)(2)).
42. Tafoya, supra note 6, at 47 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (2006)). R
43. Id. at 52 n.5 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1431).
44. Id. at 47.
45. Id. at 48.
46. Id. (“Once a child turns 21 or gets married, he or she becomes a ‘son’ or ‘daugh-
ter’ and is no longer a ‘child’ for immigration purposes.”)
47. Id. 48– 49.
48. Id. at 49.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1– 4).
52. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1)).
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daughters of LPRs (F2B).53  The third preference category (F3) consists of
married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens.54  Finally, the fourth prefer-
ence category (F4) consists of brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens.55
According to subsection (d) of the INA, once the primary beneficiary has
established his or her relationship with the petitioner, the spouses and chil-
dren of the primary beneficiary can immigrate under the same preference
category as derivative beneficiaries.56  The INA defines a “child” for this
purpose as an unmarried person under the age of twenty-one.57
If USCIS determines that a qualifying relationship exists between the
petitioner and the primary beneficiary, USCIS puts the beneficiary “in
line” based on the date the petition was filed (the “priority date”) in the
appropriate preference category.58  When a visa becomes available for the
beneficiary named in the petition, the petition’s priority date becomes
“current.”59  If a parent lists his or her child as a derivative beneficiary, but
the child reaches the age of twenty-one before the petition becomes cur-
rent, the child will no longer qualify for derivative beneficiary status.60
This phenomenon is known as aging out.61  Aging out can impede an indi-
vidual’s ability to obtain a visa because an individual who has aged out will
have to adjust the beneficiary status of his or her application to reflect the
new qualifying relationship that applies, and in some cases, no such quali-
fying relationship exists.62  The original INA did not account for this
phenomenon.63
2. Child Status Protection Act
In 2002, Congress filled this gap in the INA by passing the CSPA.64
Congress recognized that administrative delays were causing backlogs in
the processing and adjudication of visa petitions and applications, which
resulted in the aging out of child beneficiaries.65  Introducing the bill in the
Senate, Senator Dianne Feinstein advocated for the bill’s passage to allevi-
ate the dilemma faced by immigrant parents whose aged-out children were
being forced to shift to a lower preference category and wait at the bottom
53. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2)(A) and (B)).
54. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(3)).
55. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(4)).
56. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1153(d))
57. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b) (2006).
58. De Osorio v. Mayorkas, 695 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 2012). (en banc), rev’g on
reh’g, 656 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2011).
59. Id.
60. Tafoya, supra note 6, at 48. R
61. Id.
62. See Brief of the American Immigration Council and American Immigration Law-
yers Assn. as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Plaintiffs-Appellants at 1, Li v. Renaud
654 F.3d 376 (2d Cir.2011) (No. 10-2560-cv).
63. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-45, at 1– 2 (2001), reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 640,
640– 41.
64. Christina A. Pryor, Note, “Aging Out” of Immigration: Analyzing Family Preference
Visa Petitions Under the Child Status Protection Act, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2199, 2211
(2012).
65. Id. at 2212.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\46-3\CIN306.txt unknown Seq: 8  8-JAN-14 14:08
690 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 46
of a long waiting list.66  The Senator expressed concern that these parents
would have to decide to either leave their children behind or “remain in
their country of origin and lose out on their American dream in the United
States.”67  The Act’s co-sponsor, Representative Sheila Jackson-Lee, stated
that the purpose of the CSPA was to solve “the age out problem without
displacing others who have been waiting patiently in other visa
categories.”68
Subsections (h)(1)– (3) of the CSPA specify when an alien will be con-
sidered a child for the purpose of a family-sponsored visa petition, and
specify what happens to a child’s petition if he or she reaches age twenty-
one before his or her parent’s priority date becomes current.69  Subsection
(h)(1) lays out the formula for calculating a child’s age under the INA.70  If
the formula is employed and the resulting number is less than twenty-one,
the alien will be considered a child for INA purposes.71  Subsection (h)(1)
states:
For purposes of subsections (a)(2)(A) and (d) of this section, a determina-
tion of whether an alien satisfies the age requirement in the matter preced-
ing subparagraph (A) of section 1101(b)(1) of this title shall be made
using—
(A) the age of the alien on the date on which an immigrant visa num-
ber becomes available for such alien (or, in the case of subsection
(d) of this section, the date on which an immigrant visa number
became available for the alien’s parent), but only if the alien has
sought to acquire the status of an alien lawfully admitted for per-
manent residence within one year of such availability; reduced by
(B) the number of days in the period during which the applicable
petition described in paragraph (2) was pending.72
In other words, an alien’s age is determined by taking the age of the alien
on the date on which an immigrant visa number first became available for
that alien or for his alien parent, and reducing that age by the number of
days between when the petition was filed with USCIS and when USCIS
approved the petition.73  However, this formula for age determination only
applies if the alien seeks to acquire LPR status within one year of the date
when the relevant visa became available.74  As previously mentioned, sub-
section (a)(2)(A) of the INA describes F2A petitions for spouses and chil-
dren of LPRs and subsection (d) entitles spouses and children of
immigrants to be included on the petition as derivative beneficiaries.75
Because subsection (h)(1) begins with the words “for the purposes of sub-
66. Id. at 2212– 13.
67. Id. at 2213 (quoting 147 CONG. REC. 5239 (statement of Sen. Feinstein)).
68. Pryor, supra note 64, at 2213. R
69. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h) (2006).
70. De Osorio v. Mayorkas, 695 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), rev’g on
reh’g, 656 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2011).
71. Pryor, supra note 64, at 2213. R
72. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(1).
73. See Pryor, supra note 64, at 2213. R
74. See id.
75. See supra pp. 684– 685.
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sections (a)(2)(A) and (d),” the formula described therein should apply to
F2A visa petitions for children of LPRs and to any other family preference
petition on which a child is listed as a derivative beneficiary.76  Subsection
(h)(2) further clarifies that the formula in the previous subsection applies
to such petitions by stating:
The petition described in this paragraph is—
(A) with respect to a relationship described in subsection (a)(2)(A)
of this section, a petition filed under section 1154 of this title for
classification of an alien child under subsection (a)(2)(A) of this
section; or
(B) with respect to an alien child who is a derivative beneficiary
under subsection (d) of this section, a petition filed under section
1154 of this title for classification of the alien’s parent under sub-
section (a), (b), or (c) of this section.77
Subsection (h)(3) addresses petitions of individuals who are calculated to
be twenty-one or over under the formula in subsection (h)(1).78  It states:
If the age of an alien is determined under paragraph (1) to be 21 years of age
or older for the purposes of subsections (a)(2)(A) and (d) of this section, the
alien’s petition shall automatically be converted to the appropriate category
and the alien shall retain the original priority date issued upon receipt of the
original petition.79
In other words, even if an alien described in this subsection ages out of
child status for purposes of his original petition, he will be able to use the
priority date from his original petition on his new petition.80  The effect of
this provision is to enable the beneficiary to be placed at, or close to, the
front of the visa line for the new category, rather than at the back of the
line, which is where he would be if he started a new visa petition
application.81
Differing interpretations of subsection (h)(3) have led to disagreement
among U.S. courts regarding which beneficiaries under the various types
of family visa petitions are entitled to automatic conversion and date reten-
tion.82  In particular, U.S. courts have reached different conclusions as to
whether the benefits of subsection (h)(3) apply to aliens who have aged out
and who are therefore forced to have a new petitioner file for a visa on their
behalf.83  A new petitioner is required for those aged-out aliens who no
longer possess a qualifying family relationship with the original peti-
tioner.84  To illustrate, a U.S. citizen may file an F1 petition on behalf of his
unmarried daughter and list his daughter’s child as a derivative beneficiary
76. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(1).
77. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(2).
78. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3).
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See discussion infra Part I.B.
83. Id.
84. See Li v. Renaud, 654 F.3d 376, 379, 381 (2d Cir. 2011).
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of the petition.85  However, if the child turns twenty-one before the priority
date of the petition becomes current, the child’s grandfather can no longer
directly file a petition on the child’s behalf.86  This is because there is no
preference category for the grandchildren of U.S. citizens (i.e. no qualifying
relationship exists).87
B. The Split Among the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals
1. Board of Immigration Appeals Decision
The first court to rule on this matter was the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA).88  In Matter of Wang, the BIA reviewed the director of the
California Service Center’s decision approving an F2B visa petition filed by
petitioner Xiuyi Wang on behalf of his unmarried daughter, but denying
Wang’s request to assign an earlier priority date to the petition.89  The case
reached the BIA after the director elected to have her decision certified due
to the “absence of established precedent on the applicability of the CSPA in
this situation.”90  Petitioner Wang became an LPR after his citizen sister
filed an F4 visa petition on his behalf on December 28, 1992, pursuant to
subsection (a)(4) of the INA, in which she listed petitioner Wang as the
primary beneficiary and listed his daughter, who was ten years old at the
time, as a derivative beneficiary.91  A visa became available for the peti-
tioner in February of 2005, but by that time, his daughter was twenty-two
years old and no longer qualified as a “child” for purposes of derivative
beneficiary status.92  As no preference category existed for nieces and
nephews of U.S. citizens or LPRs, petitioner Wang was forced to file a new
petition on his daughter’s behalf.93  Petitioner Wang filed an F2B visa peti-
tion on September 5, 2006 pursuant to subsection (a)(2)(B) of the INA and
sought to have his daughter assigned the priority date that was given to the
original F4 petition (December 28, 1992).94
The director approved the F2B visa petition on March 25, 2008, but
refused to assign it the 1992 priority date, instead assigning it the date on
which the petition was filed (September 5,2006).95  As a result, petitioner
Wang’s daughter was placed at the end of the visa waitlist, even though she
85. See, e.g., id. at 379.
86. See, e.g., id. at 381.
87. See, e.g., id.
88. Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE (Nov. 2011), http://www.jus-
tice.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm.  The BIA is an administrative body with nationwide jurisdic-
tion to hear appeals from decisions rendered by immigration judges and district
directors of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Id.  In all cases before the
BIA, the United States is one party and the other party is an alien, a citizen, or a busi-
ness firm. Id.
89. Matter of Wang, 25 I. & N. Dec. 28, 28 (BIA 2009).  Xixui Wang was an LPR of
the United States and a native citizen of China. Id. at 28– 29.
90. Id. at 30.
91. Id. at 29.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 29, 35– 36.
94. Id. at 29.
95. Id. at 29.
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had already waited fourteen years as a derivative beneficiary of the F4 peti-
tion filed by her citizen aunt.96  On appeal, the BIA noted that there was no
evidence that petitioner Wang’s daughter had sought LPR status within a
year of the visa petition becoming available, as required by subsection
(h)(1).97  However, the BIA did not address whether this defect barred peti-
tioner Wang’s daughter from using subsection (h)(3).98  Instead, the BIA
sought to determine whether subsection (h)(3) “permits an automatic con-
version from a fourth-preference visa petition to a second-preference visa
petition with retention of the priority date of the fourth-preference
petition.”99
The BIA found that the language of the CSPA was ambiguous; there-
fore, a determination on the matter required the BIA to look to legislative
intent.100  According to the BIA, prior usage of the concept of “conversion”
in immigration regulations had consistently applied to situations where a
visa petition converted from one category to another and the beneficiary of
that petition fell into a new category without filing a new petition.101
Additionally, prior usage of priority date retention had applied to petitions
filed by the same family member.102  On this basis, the BIA upheld the
director’s decision not to apply automatic conversion and priority date
retention to the beneficiary’s new petition filed by a different family mem-
ber.103  The BIA stated that “absent clear legislative intent,” it was reluctant
to “create an open-ended grandfathering of priority dates that allow deriva-
tive beneficiaries to retain an earlier priority date set in the context of a
different relationship, to be used at any time.”104
2. Second Circuit Decision
In June 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled
on a different case presenting this same issue.105  In Li v. Renaud, the Sec-
ond Circuit reviewed a decision by the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York dismissing for failure to state a claim the complaint
filed by petitioner Feimei Li, an LPR of the United States and a native citi-
zen of China.106  The district court had held that because the CSPA was
ambiguous, the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. required the district court to defer to the
BIA’s construction of the statute.107  On appeal, the petitioner, a mother,
96. See id.
97. Id. at 33.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 35
102. Id.
103. Id. at 39.
104. Id.
105. Li v. Renaud, 654 F.3d 376, 376– 77, 379 (2d Cir. 2011), aff’g Li v. Renaud, 709
F. Supp. 2d 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
106. Id.
107. Li, 654 F.3d at 380 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
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argued that the unambiguous terms of the CSPA (in particular, subsection
(h)(3)) entitled her son to retain the priority date of his grandfather’s peti-
tion, even though he had aged out of eligibility for a visa as a derivative
beneficiary to his grandfather’s petition.108
The facts of Li are as follows.  On June 6, 1994, petitioner’s father, an
LPR of the United States, filed an F2B visa petition on behalf of his unmar-
ried daughter (the primary beneficiary and also the petitioner in Li) and
her fourteen-year-old son (the derivative beneficiary).109  The INS approved
the petition on April 4, 1995, but petitioner did not receive a visa until
March 2005, at which point, her son was twenty-six.110  Three years later,
on April 25, 2008, petitioner filed a new F2B visa petition as an LPR on
behalf of her unmarried adult son (now the primary beneficiary of the new
visa petition) and requested that he be assigned the original priority date of
June 6, 1994.111  USCIS approved the 2008 petition on August 7, 2008, but
rejected petitioner’s request to maintain the 1994 priority date and instead,
set the date as April 25, 2008.112  Petitioner acknowledged that her son
was no longer eligible as a derivative beneficiary to the 1994 petition
because there was no family preference category for grandchildren, but she
argued that subsection (h)(3) permitted automatic conversion and date
retention for aged-out beneficiaries, even if the petitioner for the two visa
petitions was not the same.113
To decide this case, the Second Circuit first had to determine whether
deference to the BIA’s interpretation of subsection (h)(3) was appropri-
ate.114  According to the Supreme Court in Chevron, the first step in this
analysis is to determine “whether Congress has directly spoken to the pre-
cise question at issue” because if it has, “that is the end of the matter” and
the court “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Con-
gress.”115  The Second Circuit found that Congress was clear as to
“whether a derivative beneficiary who ages out of one family preference
petition may retain the priority date of that petition to use for a different
family preference petition filed by a different petitioner” and therefore, the
Second Circuit did not defer to the BIA’s interpretation.116  The Second
Circuit instead looked to the “If X, [then] A and B” structure of the text in
subsection (h)(3) and concluded that in subsection (h)(3), Congress
intended to require “both an automatic conversion to a different category
and a retention of the original priority date,” unlike in other subsections
where Congress made conversion and retention “distinct and independent
108. Id. at 377.
109. Id. at 379.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 381.
114. Id. at 382.
115. Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842– 43 (1984)).
116. Id. at 382– 83.
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benefits.”117
The court then determined that it was impossible for the petition to be
converted to the appropriate category because “conversion to the appropri-
ate category,” as used in the CSPA, refers only to petitions in which the
category has changed, but not the petitioner.118  The court concluded that
because subsection (h)(3) required both automatic conversion and reten-
tion, and because it was not possible for petitioner’s son to be converted to
an appropriate category with respect to his grandfather’s petition, peti-
tioner’s son was not eligible to retain the 1994 priority date of his grandfa-
ther’s petition.119  The Second Circuit therefore affirmed the district
court’s decision to dismiss petitioner’s compliant for failure to state a
claim.120
3. Fifth Circuit Decision
In Khalid v. Holder, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reviewed a BIA order dismissing a petitioner’s appeal from an Immigration
Judge’s (IJ’s) decision ordering the petitioner removed from the United
States.121  Petitioner Mohammad Abubakar Khalid, a citizen of Pakistan,
was admitted into the United States in 1996 at the age of eleven on a visi-
tor’s visa.122  Petitioner’s aunt, a U.S. citizen, had already filed an F4 peti-
tion on January 12, 1996 on behalf of petitioner’s mother, listing petitioner
as a derivative beneficiary.123  The petition was assigned a January 1996
priority date, but did not become current until February 2007, when peti-
tioner was twenty-two years old.124  Petitioner attempted to adjust his sta-
tus so that he could remain a derivative beneficiary of his aunt’s petition,
but the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) denied his application,
reasoning that immigration law no longer considered petitioner a child.125
Later that year, petitioner’s mother filed a new F2B petition as an LPR on
petitioner’s behalf, which was assigned a priority date of November 23,
2007.126
After DHS denied petitioner’s application, it commenced removal pro-
ceedings against him for overstaying his visa in violation of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(1)(B).127  In March 2008, at the immigration court hearing, peti-
tioner argued that he should be allowed to adjust his immigration status by
assigning the new F2B petition the January 1996 priority date from the
original F4 petition, making him immediately eligible for a visa.128  Rely-
117. Id. at 383.
118. Id. at 384.
119. Id. at 385.
120. Id.
121. Khalid v. Holder, 655 F.3d 363, 365 (5th Cir. 2011).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 366.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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ing on the BIA’s decision in Matter of Wang, the IJ rejected petitioner’s argu-
ment and denied his application for a status adjustment.129  On appeal to
the BIA, the court was not persuaded by petitioner’s argument and
declined to reconsider its decision in Matter of Wang.130
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the court determined, as the Second
Circuit had done, that the language of the CSPA was not ambiguous.131  It
found that although subsection (h)(3) did not explicitly describe which
petitions qualified for automatic conversion and priority date retention,
subsection (h)(3) was not ambiguous, given the language in the rest of sub-
section (h).132  The Fifth Circuit then proceeded to analyze the language of
subsection (h)(3) and rejected the BIA’s conclusion that subsection (h)(2)
applies only to subsection (h)(1) and not to subsection (h)(3).133  The Fifth
Circuit determined that the BIA’s analysis “ignores the fact that (h)(3)
expressly references (h)(1), which in turn expressly references (h)(2).”134
The Fifth Circuit held that the provisions’ interrelatedness indicated Con-
gress’ intent that subsection (h)(3) apply to any alien whose age was calcu-
lated to be twenty-one or over by the formula in (h)(1) and who was listed
as a derivative beneficiary under any of the petitions described in
(h)(2).135  The court further noted that nothing in the text of subsection
(h)(3) implied that automatic conversion would not apply if a different per-
son filed each petition.136
The court explicitly recognized that its conclusion was irreconcilable
with the decision of the Second Circuit in Li v. Renaud, but it respectfully
disagreed with its sister court.137  The Fifth Circuit stated that “under the
Li court’s restrictive reading,” the benefits under subsection (h)(3) would
only be available to derivative beneficiaries of second preference visa peti-
tions.138  The Fifth Circuit provided a hypothetical example of a child join-
ing on the petition of a parent who was named as a primary beneficiary on
an F2A petition filed by the parent’s LPR spouse (i.e. the child’s other par-
ent).139  Even if a child in this situation aged out before his or her immi-
grant parent was granted LPR status, his or her petition could simply be
converted to an F2B petition for an unmarried son or daughter of an LPR
because the parent who filed the original petition could equally file the
new petition.140  The court conceded that this was a benefit for some aged-
out beneficiaries, but it pointed out that priority date retention had already
been available for individuals in such situations since 1987 under 8 C.F.R.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 370.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 371.
136. See id. at 373.
137. Id. at 373.
138. Id. at 374.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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§ 204.2(a)(4).141  The Fifth Circuit stated, “the only difference between the
regulation and the Li court’s reading of subsection (h)(3) is that the statute
would relieve the spouse of the burden of filing a new petition, since the
conversion would now be automatic” and concluded, “[w]e are skeptical
that this meager benefit was all Congress meant to accomplish through
subsection (h)(3), especially where nothing in the statute singles out deriv-
ative beneficiaries of second-preference petitions for special treatment.”142
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit held that the benefits of subsection (h)(3)
applied to all petitions described in subsection (h)(2), including the peti-
tioner’s original F4 petition, and it remanded the case to the BIA for further
proceedings.143  As of September 11, 2012, the BIA has denied DHS’
motion to administratively close the proceedings pending the outcome of
the Ninth’s Circuit’s decision in De Osorio v. Mayorkas and has remanded
the record to the IJ for further proceedings.144
4. Ninth Circuit Decision
In De Osorio v. Mayorkas, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed a decision rendered one year earlier by its own three-judge
panel.145  The Ninth Circuit had previously affirmed the Central District of
California’s decision granting summary judgment to USCIS on the basis of
the BIA’s decision in Matter of Wang.146  In May 1998, petitioner’s citizen
mother filed an F3 visa petition (for a married daughter of a U.S. citizen)
on petitioner’s behalf, listing petitioner as the primary beneficiary and list-
ing petitioner’s then thirteen-year-old son as the derivative beneficiary.147
The F3 visa was approved in June 1998, but it did not become current until
November 2005, when petitioner’s son was twenty-one years old.148  In
August 2006, petitioner immigrated to the United States as an LPR and, in
July 2007, filed a new F2B petition on her son’s behalf.149  Petitioner
requested that USCIS retain the May 1998 priority date from the original
F3 petition for the new F2B petition.150  USCIS refused, placing peti-
tioner’s son at the back of the line for an F2B visa.151  In response, peti-
tioner and other similarly situated immigrants sued USCIS in federal
district court.152
On rehearing, the Ninth Circuit performed the same analysis that the
Fifth Circuit performed in Khalid v. Holder and reached the same conclu-
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 375.
144. In Re: Mohammad Abubakar Khalid, 2012 WL 5178831, at *1 (BIA Sept. 11,
2012).
145. Graham, supra note 20. R
146. De Osorio v. Mayorkas, 695 F.3d 1003, 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
147. Id. at 1010.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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sion.153  The Ninth Circuit first determined that the language of the CSPA
was unambiguous and then interpreted the language of the statute.154  The
Ninth Circuit stated that it “read Congress’s repeated references to ‘subsec-
tions (a)(2)(A) and (d)’ as expressions of its intent to extend automatic
conversion and priority date retention to all family-sponsored derivative
beneficiaries.”155  The court determined that the reference in subsection
(h)(3) to the “original petition” was evidence that Congress contemplated
the possibility of immigrants obtaining new petitions “either by editing the
original petition or ‘automatically’ requesting a new petition that identifies
a new petitioner and primary beneficiary.”156  Additionally, the Court
stated that if Congress intended to limit automatic conversion to petitions
in which the petitioner remained the same, it should have used language
similar to that used in 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(4), the statute that predated the
CSPA, which explicitly required the identity of the petitioner to remain the
same in order for an immigrant to qualify for priority date retention.157
The Ninth Circuit ultimately reversed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, stating, “[w]e
join the Fifth Circuit in ‘giv[ing] effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress.’”158
II. The Supreme Court Should Adopt the Fifth and Ninth Circuits’
Interpretation
This Part contends that the Supreme Court should resolve the current
circuit split by adopting the Fifth and Ninth Circuits’ interpretation of the
CSPA when it decides De Osorio v. Mayorkas.  First, this Part analyzes the
outcome if the Supreme Court adopts the Second Circuit’s interpretation,
arguing that such a holding would lead to absurd results.  Next, this Part
provides the reasons why the Supreme Court should adopt the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits’ interpretation that automatic conversion and priority date
retention under subsection (h)(3) apply to all family-sponsored visa peti-
tions.  Finally, it argues that policy considerations favor the adoption of the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits’ interpretation of the CSPA.
A. The Second Circuit’s Interpretation Leads to Absurd Results
The Second Circuit’s interpretation of the CSPA leads to at least two
categories of absurd results.  The first category involves what will happen if
the Supreme Court adopts the Second Circuit’s interpretation in deciding
De Osorio v. Mayorkas at the same time as the Obama Administration’s
current DACA immigration policy remains in effect. Under DACA, illegal
immigrants who came to the United States as children are given temporary
153. See id. at 1011– 16.
154. See id. at 1012.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1014.
157. Id. at 1015.
158. Id. at 1016 (alteration in original).
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legal status to remain in the United States, provided that they satisfy cer-
tain requirements.159  Janet Napolitano, the Secretary of Homeland Secur-
ity at the time, issued a Memorandum outlining the criteria that an illegal
immigrant must satisfy in order to have his or her case considered for this
exercise of prosecutorial discretion and to prevent his or her removal from
the United States.160  The criteria are that the individual:
• Came to the United States under the age of sixteen;
• Has continuously resided in the United States for a [sic] least five years
preceding the date of this memorandum and is present in the United
States on the date of this memorandum;
• Is currently in school, has graduated from high school, has obtained a
general education development certificate, or is an honorably discharged
veteran of the Coast Guard or Armed Forces of the United States;
• Has not been convicted of a felony offense, a significant misdemeanor
offense, multiple misdemeanor offenses, or otherwise poses a threat to
national security or public safety; and
• Is not above the age of thirty.161
To request consideration for deferred action, an individual who satisfies all
of the criteria and is at least fifteen years old (unless he is currently in
removal proceedings or has a final removal or voluntary departure order)
must mail USCIS (1) documentary proof establishing that the criteria are
met, (2) a Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals form,
(3) an Application for Employment Authorization, and (4) a worksheet to
establish economic need for employment.162  If USCIS decides to defer
action against a particular individual, the individual can remain in the
United States for a period of two years, subject to renewal, and the individ-
ual will become eligible for work authorization.163  Although DACA does
not guarantee that all eligible individuals will become LPRs,164 it does
allow the individual to bide time by obtaining temporary legal status until
a pending visa petition becomes current.165  By granting work authoriza-
tion for these individuals, the policy also might make it more likely for an
illegal immigrant to become an LPR through an employment-based visa
petition pursuant to the INA.166
159. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to David V.
Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., on Exercising Prosecutorial Dis-
cretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children 1 (Jun.
15, 2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-
discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Process, U.S. CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGR. SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/childhoodarrivals (last updated Jan. 18,
2013).
163. See Lyndsey Marcelino, DACA Brings Hope and Caution for Undocumented Young
People, CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y BLOG (Oct. 4, 2012, 1:54 AM), http://www.jlpp.org/
2012/10/04/daca-brings-hope-and-caution-for-undocumented-young-people.
164. Id.
165. See id.
166. See 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(3) (2006).
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A Supreme Court decision favoring the Second Circuit’s interpretation
of the CSPA would lead to absurd results when considered in conjunction
with DACA.  In Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice,167 Justice Ken-
nedy articulated the rule that “[w]here the plain language of the statute
would lead to ‘patently absurd consequences,’ that ‘Congress could not
possibly have intended,’ we need not apply the language in such a fash-
ion.”168  This rule can be applied to the Second Circuit’s decision in Li v.
Renaud, where the court held that an individual is not entitled to priority
date retention when the identity of his petitioner changes because such
petitions “cannot be converted to an appropriate category” and because the
text of the provision requires automatic conversion and priority date reten-
tion to occur together.169  The court determined that automatic conversion
and priority date retention were to occur together due to the “if X, [then] A
and B” structure of subsection (h)(3), reasoning that if Congress had
intended to give beneficiaries the option to select either conversion or reten-
tion or both, it would have done so.170
It is true, as the Second Circuit notes, that subsection (h)(3) possesses
an “If X, [then] A and B” structure with respect to automatic conversion
and priority date retention because it states, “[i]f the age of an alien is
determined under paragraph (1) to be 21 years of age or older . . . the
alien’s petition shall automatically be converted to the appropriate category
and the alien shall retain the original priority date issued upon receipt of
the original petition.”171  However, reading this statutory language as the
Second Circuit does (to mean that if a petition cannot be converted to an
appropriate category, it also cannot retain its original priority date) would
result in the singling out of a particular class of aged-out derivative benefi-
ciaries.  Congress could not have intended to leave an entire subset of aged-
out individuals in exactly the same position that they were in before the
passage of the CSPA.  Doing so would, in effect, cause the CSPA to fail at its
main purpose of fixing the aging out problem.  This consequence is partic-
ularly absurd because at no point in the legislative history of the CSPA did
Congress indicate an intention to subdivide aged-out derivative benefi-
ciaries into distinct classes in order to treat these classes unequally.172
This absurdity is confirmed if one examines the Second Circuit’s inter-
pretation together with DACA.  With both of these policies in place, certain
individuals who attempted to immigrate to the United States legally as chil-
167. 491 U.S. 440, (1989).
168. Id. at 440 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18,
27 (1948) and FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 640 (1982) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
The “absurd result principle” enjoys wide acceptance in the U.S. legal system, but the
cases in which it is used and referred to neither define absurdity, nor specify the situa-
tions in which the principle should be applied.  Veronica M. Dougherty, Absurdity and
the Limits of Literalism: Defining the Absurd Result Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 44
AM. U. L. REV. 127, 128– 29 (1994).
169. Li v. Renaud, 654 F.3d 376, 383, 385 (2d Cir. 2011); see also supra text accompa-
nying notes 117– 119. R
170. Li, 654 F.3d at 383.
171. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3) (emphasis added).
172. H.R. REP. NO. 107-45, at 2 (2001), reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 640, 640– 41.
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dren will continue to have to wait on multiple waitlists, perhaps for a dec-
ade or longer, while concurrently, DACA will permit individuals who
immigrated illegally as children to stay for extended periods of time.  Such
a policy will inevitably discourage potential adult immigrants from listing
their children as derivative beneficiaries on visa petitions.  Instead, adult
immigrants will be encouraged to obtain LPR status for themselves and
thereafter bring their children (under the age of sixteen) into the United
States illegally, relying on DACA to provide a more reliable and potentially
quicker path to permanent residency for such children.  The fact that the
Second Circuit’s construction of the language of the CSPA would ultimately
lead to this patently absurd consequence means, according to Public Citi-
zen, that the Supreme Court need not apply the CSPA’s language in such a
fashion.
Carl Shusterman, a former Immigration and Naturalization Services
(INS) attorney,173 has identified a second category of absurd results that
will occur if the Supreme Court adopts the Second Circuit’s interpretation
of the CSPA.174  Shusterman poses additional hypothetical facts to the facts
of De Osorio v. Mayorkas and analyzes the facts under the Second Circuit’s
framework, in which subsection (h)(3) benefits only apply to aged-out
derivative beneficiaries whose petitions can convert to another preference
category without a change in petitioner.175  Under this framework, De
Osorio’s twenty-one-year-old son will not be able to retain the priority date
of his mother’s visa petition filed by his U.S citizen grandmother.176  How-
ever, according to the calculation in subsection (h)(1) (which reduces a
child’s age by “the number of days . . . [the] petition described in paragraph
(2) was pending”177), it would be possible for De Osorio and her hypothet-
ical twenty-four-year-old nephew to immigrate at the same time.178
This outcome would be possible if De Osorio’s mother simultaneously
filed F3 visa petitions for De Osorio and her sister, Suerte, and listed
Suerte’s son (who is three years older than De Osorio’s son) as a derivative
beneficiary, but Suerte’s application was lost and, as a result, was not
approved until four years later.179  According to the text of subsection
(h)(1), Suerte’s son would be twenty years old for INA purposes because
his application was pending for four years (between 1998 and 2002) before
it was approved in 2005, when he was twenty-four years old.180  Shus-
terman points out that in this “not-so-far-fetched scenario, Suerte’s [twenty-
173. Our Immigration Attorneys, LAW OFFICES OF CARL SHUSTERMAN, http://shus-
terman.com/ourimmigrationattorneys.html (last visited July 7, 2013).
174. See Carl Shusterman, Supreme Court Agrees to Review CSPA Victory in the Court of
Appeals, CARL SHUSTERMAN’S IMMIGR. UPDATE (June 26, 2013, 9:26 AM), http://blogs.ilw.
com/carlshusterman/2013/06/supreme-court-agrees-to-review-cspa-victory-in-the-court-
of-appeals.html.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(1) (2006).
178. Shusterman, supra note 174. R
179. Id.
180. Id.
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four]-year-old son is able to immigrate together with his mother while his
[twenty-one]-year-old cousin remains separated from his mother for almost
a decade with no end in sight.”181  He adds that Congress likely intended
the benefits under subsection (h)(3) to apply to those individuals who did
not qualify under subsection (h)(1).182  This second category of absurd
results is further proof that the proper interpretation of the CSPA is that of
the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, in which the benefits of subsection (h)(3)
apply to derivative beneficiaries of all family preference categories.
B. Subsection (h)(3) Benefits Apply to All Family-Sponsored Visa
Petitions
1. Chevron Deference Does Not Apply
Although the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have all concluded that
the BIA’s decision in Matter of Wang is not entitled to Chevron deference, a
Chevron analysis is worthwhile because it will shed light on both the clarity
of the CSPA’s text and Congress’s intent in passing the statute.  In Chevron,
the Supreme Court established a two-prong test for determining when U.S.
courts should defer to a government agency’s interpretation of a statute.183
The first question a reviewing court must ask is whether Congress has spo-
ken to the precise question at issue, i.e., whether the particular provision of
the statute is unambiguous.184  If there is an unambiguous statutory provi-
sion on point, the Chevron inquiry ends, and the court can proceed with its
own interpretation of the statute.185  If the statute is ambiguous, however,
the court must proceed to the second Chevron step, which is a determina-
tion of whether the agency’s interpretation is based on a reasonable policy
choice.186  If the reviewing court deems the agency interpretation to be
unreasonable, it may proceed with its own interpretation of the statute.187
In a Note about the issue of aging out of family-sponsored visa peti-
tions, Christina Pryor argues that although the plain language of subsec-
tion (h)(3) is clear, the provision is ambiguous when applied because, she
claims, when read in context, it “does not make sense.”188  Pryor argues
that on its face, the statute appears unambiguous because it states that an
alien’s petition shall “automatically convert;” she asserts that in practice,
however, the statute is ambiguous because automatic conversion is only
possible for certain visa petitions (F1, F2A) and is not possible for others
(F2B, F3 and F4).189  Pryor also argues that the statute is ambiguous
because the text does not explicitly state whether priority date retention
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984);
see also De Osorio v. Mayorkas, 695 F.3d 1003, 1011 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
184. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842– 43; De Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1011.
185. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842– 43; De Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1011..
186. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; De Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1011.
187. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845; De Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1020 (Smith, J., dissenting).
188. Pryor, supra note 64, at 2232. R
189. See id.
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and automatic conversion can be applied independently of one another.190
Pryor’s argument is problematic because it does not comport with
Supreme Court precedent.191  The Supreme Court, in Dole v. United Steel-
workers of America, articulated the rule that a court may decide not to defer
to an agency’s interpretation of a statute if the statute “as a whole, clearly
expresses Congress’ intention.”192 Dole indicates that there can be more
than one valid interpretation of a single statute.193  Congress’s clear inten-
tion in passing the CSPA was to help young adult aliens avoid the excessive
wait times that result when such aliens age out of derivative beneficiary
status.194  This intention has been communicated by members of Congress
who were influential in writing the legislation, such as Senator Feinstein
and Senator Jackson-Lee, and is also made clear by the language of the
statute.195  In particular, subsection (h)(3) states that those petitioners
who have aged out according to the calculation in subsection (h)(1) are
permitted to convert their original petition to a new petition and are per-
mitted to preserve the date from the original petition without having to re-
file.196  This provision inevitably achieves the aim of the CSPA— preventing
excessive delays for those who, as derivative beneficiaries, have already
waited for visas.
It is important to note that just because the Fifth and Ninth Circuits
have split with the Second Circuit over whether the text of subsection
(h)(3) affords automatic conversion and priority date retention to benefi-
ciaries of all family petitions, this split does not establish that the statute is
ambiguous.  The Supreme Court has held that the existence of a circuit
split does not itself render a statute ambiguous.197  Pryor’s main argument
is that although the plain language of subsection (h)(3) is clear, it is ambig-
uous in practice because there are alternate ways to interpret the statutory
language to determine which beneficiaries are subject to the benefits of
subsection (h)(3).198  This argument amounts to a claim that the statute is
ambiguous simply because the Ninth Circuit and Second Circuit have
drawn different interpretations of the beneficiaries to which the subsection
applies.  However, this claim ignores the Supreme Court’s rule in Dole—
that circuit courts are permitted to draw different interpretations of a stat-
ute’s text.  Therefore, because the statute is not ambiguous, Chevron defer-
ence should not apply.
190. Id.
191. See, e.g., Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 42 (1990).
192. Khalid v. Holder, 655 F.3d 363, 367 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Dole, 494 U.S. at 42).
193. See Dole, 494 U.S. at 42.
194. Pryor, supra note 64, at 2212. R
195. See supra text accompanying notes 64– 68. R
196. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3) (2006).
197. See De Osorio v. Mayorkas, 695 F.3d 1003, 1012 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (cit-
ing, for example, Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1350 (2012).
198. See Pryor, supra note 64, at 2232. R
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2. The Plain Language of the Statute Dictates the Proper Result
The Supreme Court should adopt the interpretation of the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits because the plain, unambiguous language of the CSPA dic-
tates that aged-out derivative beneficiaries of all family-sponsored visa peti-
tions are entitled to automatic conversion and to priority date retention
under subsection (h)(3).  The Second Circuit has concluded that the bene-
fits in subsection (h)(3) do not apply to an alien who files with a new
petitioner after aging out because the benefits only apply to those petitions
that can automatically convert, and a conversion cannot happen automati-
cally if an applicant is forced to change petitioners.199  The Second Circuit
concludes that according to subsection (h)(3), only automatically con-
verting petitions are entitled to benefits because the text of subsection
(h)(3) does not explicitly refer to petitions other than those that automati-
cally convert.200  This argument is flawed because, as the Fifth Circuit
stated in Khalid, subsection (h)(3) expressly references (h)(1), which
expressly references (h)(2), meaning that subsection (h)(3) applies to all of
the petitions described in (h)(2).201  Subsection (h)(2) sets forth the peti-
tions to which the formula in (h)(1) for calculating age under the INA
applies, including F2A petitions and all petitions on which children are
listed as derivative beneficiaries pursuant to subsection (d).202  Therefore,
the benefits of subsection (h)(3) apply to any alien whose age was calcu-
lated to be twenty-one or over by the formula in (h)(1) and who was listed
as a derivative beneficiary under any of the petitions described in (h)(2).
Additionally, as previously mentioned in this Part, there is disagree-
ment over whether the “if X, [then] A and B” structure of subsection (h)(3)
means that Congress intended for the automatic conversion and priority
date retention benefits to always occur together, or whether they may occur
independently of one another.  Aside from the potential for absurd conse-
quences by construing this language to mean that they must occur
together, there is a persuasive argument that the plain language of the pro-
vision dictates that they may occur independently.  The American Immi-
gration Council (AIC) and American Immigration Lawyers Association
(AILA) argue that “Congress intended for the word ‘and’ as used here to
operate simply as a means to connect two independent phrases— the auto-
matic conversion phrase and the retention of priority date phrase.”203  The
AIC and AILA note that Congress frequently uses “and” as a method to
connect more than one alternative and that Congress even used this
method in the same subsection when it stated, “for the purposes of subsec-
tions (a)(2)(A) and (d).”204  A person cannot simultaneously be a benefici-
199. Li v. Renaud, 654 F.3d 376, 384 (2d Cir. 2011).
200. Id. at 384– 85.  Subsection (h)(2) encompasses petitions other than those that
automatically convert.  8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(2).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 131– 136. R
202. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(2) (2006).
203. Brief for the Am. Immigr. Council & Am. Immigr. Lawyers Ass’n as Amici Curiae
Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants at 16, Li v. Renaud 654 F.3d 376 (2d Cir.2011) (No. 10-
2560-cv).
204. Id. at 17.
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ary of both of these subsections, so Congress must have been using “and”
to refer to beneficiaries of either category.205  If, as the AIC and AILA
argue, the benefits are distinct and independent, a beneficiary who is
forced to change petitioners after he ages out will still be entitled to priority
date retention, even though the original petition does not convert
automatically.
C. Policy Considerations
Apart from proper statutory interpretation, there are significant policy
reasons for allowing family members in all of the four preference categories
to immigrate sooner rather than later under the CSPA.  For example, family
reunification policies for immigrants can provide benefits to U.S. society,
including facilitating the integration of immigrants into a new country, a
major concern for countries that allow immigration.206  Countries with
large numbers of immigrants likely want to maintain their national identity
and promote assimilation, but these goals arguably can be achieved by
allowing immigrants to start a complete and normal life in the new country
with their families.  If parents are forced to leave their children behind
when they immigrate, they may not establish the same connections with
their community as they would if they had their children with them.  Simi-
larly, common sense dictates that it is likely easier for children and young
adults to assimilate than it is for older individuals, given that older individ-
uals have a greater degree of exposure to the country they leave behind.  In
addition to the promotion of integration, family reunification can arguably
increase the productivity of immigrants who come to the United States to
work because they will be happier overall and more likely to stay in the
country longer to develop their skills.  Above all, if family reunification is
truly a cornerstone of U.S. immigration law, there is no better policy to
promote than the speedy reunification of immigrant parents with the chil-
dren they have been forced to leave behind.
III. EU Family-Sponsored Immigration Policies and Procedures: A
Comparative
A comparison of EU and U.S. immigration policies and procedures is
both interesting and valuable in the context of this Note.  According to law
professor Lori Nessel, “EU [immigration] initiatives are often justified as
being in keeping with the American immigration regime” and, similar to
205. Id.
206. Stephen Yale-Loehr & Christoph Hoashi-Erhardt, A Comparative Look at Immi-
gration and Human Capital Assessment, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 99, 106 (2001) (“It seems
likely that the presence of a family sponsor would aid the migrant in assimilating to the
host country and lower the risk that the migrant would become an economic burden on
the host country in the event of financial hardship.”). See Lori A. Nessel, Families At
Risk: How Errant Enforcement and Restrictionist Integration Policies Threaten the Immi-
grant Family in the European Union and the United States, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1271, 1274
(2008) (“I also examine the global move toward restricting family-based immigration
and argue that such restrictions undermine, rather than advance, true integration . . . .”).
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the United States, “in the EU, calls to restrict immigration are often cen-
tered on the family.”207  Both the United States and the EU have recently
elaborated upon their existing family reunification policies as they relate to
children over the age of majority.208  On September 22, 2003, one year
after the passage of the CSPA in the United States, the Council of the EU
passed a Directive on the Right to Family Reunification (the “Directive”),
which laid out the “conditions for the exercise of the right to family reunifi-
cation by third country nationals residing lawfully in the territory of the
Member States.”209  The EU’s stated purpose of the Directive is to “protect
the family unit and to facilitate the integration of nationals of non-member
countries.”210  Similar to U.S. family reunification policies, EU policies dif-
fer depending on whether the person seeking to sponsor a family member
is a Member State citizen or a third-country national residing legally in the
Member State.211  Although the Directive applies only to third-country
nationals, its provisions are analogous to those of the INA that allow LPRs
to sponsor a visa petition for a foreign family member and that family
member’s children.212  But unlike in the United States, each EU Member
State has discretion to craft its own national legislation to govern the
reunification of citizens with their family members.213  Thus, a Member
State can even enact immigration laws that are more favorable to immi-
grants than the terms supplied by the Directive.214
Under the terms of the Directive, third-country nationals may apply
for family reunification if they hold a “residence permit issued by a Mem-
ber State for a period of validity of one year or more” and if they have
“reasonable prospects of obtaining the right of permanent residence” in the
future.215  Family members who are eligible to immigrate for family
reunification under the Directive include (1) “the sponsor’s spouse” and
(2) “the minor children of the couple (i.e. unmarried children below the
legal age of majority in the Member State concerned) or of one member of
207. Nessel, supra note 206, at 1273– 74. R
208. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006); see also Council Directive 2003/86/EC, 2003 O.J. (L
251) para. 12.
209. Council Directive 2003/86/EC, supra note 208, art. 1. R
210. Summaries of EU Legislation: Family Reunification, EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/
legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/
free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigration/l33118_en.htm (last updated Oct. 27,
2011) [hereinafter Summaries of EU Legislation].
211. See KEES GROENENDIJK ET AL., THE FAMILY REUNIFICATION DIRECTIVE IN EU MEMBER
STATES: FIRST YEAR OF IMPLEMENTATION 11 (2007) available at http://cmr.jur.ru.nl/cmr/
docs/family.RD.EU.pdf.  “[T[he Directive confines its scope of application to family
members of third-country nationals who are not Union citizens. . . . [E]xcluding dual
nationals from the scope of the Directive implies that third-country nationals lose their
right to family reunification under the Directive upon acquisition of the nationality of
the Member State of residence.” Id.
212. See Summaries of EU Legislation, supra note 210. R
213. See GROENENDIJK ET AL., supra note 211, at 11, 13.  Member State legislation can R
be more favorable than the Directive, but it cannot be inconsistent with the Directive. See
id.
214. See id.
215. Council Directive 2003/86/EC, supra note 208, art. 3. R
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the couple, where he or she has custody and the children are dependent on
him or her.”216  The Directive also gives Member States the option, subject
to certain conditions, to grant eligibility for family reunification to the
third-country national’s (1) father and mother, (2) unmarried children
above the age of majority, and (3) unmarried partner.217
The EU does not typically face the same issue as the United States of
immigrant children aging out between the time their visa application is
filed and the time it is granted.  The EU avoids this problem because it does
not have as extensive backlogs as the United States has218 and because,
under Article 8 of the Directive, “the Member State may provide for a wait-
ing period of no more than three years between submission of the applica-
tion for family reunification and the issue of a residence permit to the
family members.”219  However, the EU’s judicial branch has nonetheless
been tasked with assessing conflicting interpretations of provisions of the
Directive that would allow countries to admit immigrant children above the
age of the majority.220
After the Council passed the Directive, the European Parliament
decided to exercise its power to “start legal action for annulment of a mea-
sure of secondary [EU] law.”221  The European Parliament asked the Euro-
pean Court of Justice (ECJ) to annul all or part of Articles 4(1), 4(6), and 8
of the Directive because it found these provisions to be in violation of Arti-
cles 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).222
Article 4(1) of the Directive provides that when a child over the age of
twelve arrives independently from the rest of his family, the Member State
may require the child to meet a condition for integration before it autho-
rizes the child’s entry and residence.223  Article 4(6) provides that “mem-
ber states may request that the applications concerning family
reunification of minor children have to be submitted before the age of
15.”224  The Article continues, “if the application is submitted after the age
of 15, the Member States which decide to apply this derogation shall
authorise the entry and residence of such children on grounds other than
family reunification.”225  Finally, Article 8 lays out the aforementioned
three-year maximum waiting period between the time an application for
family reunification is submitted and the time a residence permit is
216. Summaries of EU Legislation, supra note 210. R
217. Id.
218. See Thomas Huddleston, U.S. Losing Immigrant Talent with Longest Backlogs for
Families, MIGRANT INTEGRATION POL’Y INDEX (MIPEX) BLOG (July 29, 2011, 1:51 PM),
http://www.mipex.eu/blog/us-losing-immigrant-talent-with-longest-backlogs-for-
families.
219. Council Directive 2003/86/EC, supra note 208, art. 8. R
220. See Case C-540/03, Parliament v. Council, 2006 E.C.R. I-5769.
221. GROENENDIJK ET AL., supra note 211, at 8. R
222. See id.
223. Council Directive 2003/86/EC, supra note 208, art 4(1).  Under Article 4(1) of R
the Directive, a “condition for integration” is only enforceable if it was defined in Mem-
ber State legislation that existed at the time the Directive was implemented. See id.
224. Id. art. 4(6) (emphasis added).
225. Id.
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granted.226  The ECJ’s judgment in Parliament v. Council,227 dismissed the
European Parliament’s action, but used the opportunity to clarify what it
believed were important issues regarding the meaning of these three provi-
sions of the Directive.228
Article 4(6) of the Directive is the provision that is most similar to the
INA requirement that children be under the age of twenty-one to qualify for
derivative beneficiary status.229  Although Article 4(1) of the Directive has
an age requirement as well, it addresses only children who immigrate to the
EU without their family.230  It would not be appropriate to compare the
children to whom Article 4(1) of the Directive applies with aged-out deriva-
tive beneficiaries of U.S. visa petitions because the latter immigrate with
their parents on the same visa petition.  Article 4(6), on the other hand,
provides a general age requirement that Member States may impose.231  In
its opinion in Parliament v. Council, the ECJ clarified that Article 4(6) can-
not be interpreted as “prohibiting the Member States from taking account
of an application relating to a child over 15 years of age or as authorising
them not to do so.”232  In addition, the court stated that use of the term
“family reunification” in the final sentence in Article 4(6) of the Directive,
“cannot be interpreted as prohibiting a Member State which has applied the
derogation from authorising the entry and residence of a child in order to
enable the child to join his or her parents.”233  Finally, the court stated that
even though Article 4(6) allows a Member State to require that a child be
under the age of fifteen when his or her application is submitted, the provi-
sion must be read in light of Articles 5(5) and 17 of the Directive, which
require the Member State to “examine the [child’s] application in [light of]
the interests of the child and with a view to promoting family life.”234
In sum, despite the age requirements laid out in the Directive, the ECJ
has ensured that the Directive will not necessarily preclude the admittance
of child immigrants who submit their applications when they are over the
prescribed age.  The INA, on the other hand, sets forth an absolute require-
ment that a child must be under the age of twenty-one in order to immi-
grate to the United States with his or her parent on the same family-
sponsored visa petition.  A possible reason why the United States has
upheld such an absolute requirement, while the EU has not, is because
courts in the United States frame the issue differently from courts in the
EU.  EU courts frame family reunification as an issue of international
226. Id. art. 8.
227. Case C-540/03, Parliament v. Council, 2006 E.C.R. I-5769.
228. GROENENDIJK ET AL., supra note 211, at 8. R
229. See Council Directive 2003/86/EC, supra note 208, art 4(6).  Article 4(6) per- R
mits children to immigrate on the basis of family reunification until they reach the age of
fifteen, after which time they age out of eligibility. Id.
230. Id. art 4(1).  Article 4(1) of the Directive applies to any child who is “aged over
12 years and arrives independently from the rest of his/her family.” Id.
231. Id. art 4(6).
232. Parliament, 2006 E.C.R. ¶ 85.
233. Id. ¶ 86.
234. Id. ¶¶ 87– 88.
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human rights, and they cite to international conventions, treaties, cove-
nants, and declarations in their judicial decisions interpreting family
reunification legislation.235
U.S. courts do not typically mention these principles in their deci-
sions because the United States is bound by relatively few applicable inter-
national human rights instruments.236  EU Member States are bound by
numerous international human rights treaties and conventions, including
the European Community Treaty, the ECHR, the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU
Charter), all of which provide a basis for challenging unjust immigration
policies.237  In contrast, the only binding international human rights trea-
ties that could potentially apply in the United States are the United Nations
Refugee and Torture Conventions.238
In Parliament v. Council, the ECJ took the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child into account in applying the principles of the
Directive, and it also explicitly referenced the EU Charter.239  The ECJ
drew upon these international instruments when it referenced such princi-
ples as “respect for family life” and “interests of the child” in its analysis.240
The example set by the ECJ in this decision suggests that the circuit split in
the United States could be resolved if the Supreme Court looked to princi-
ples of international law within treaties or conventions that the United
States has ratified, and justified its decision on that basis.  Unfortunately,
this approach is unlikely to occur because the Supreme Court has “shown
great deference to Congress when immigration regulation is at issue.”241
Conclusion
Upon introducing the CSPA in the Senate, Senator Feinstein called the
public’s attention to the consequences of not protecting the immigration
status of children by stating:
Under current law, lawful permanent residents who are outside of the
United States face a difficult choice when their child “ages-out” of eligibility
for a first preference visa. . . .  [They] must decide to either come to the
235. See, e.g., id. ¶ 57; see also Nessel, supra note 206, at 1300. R
236. Nessel, supra note 206, at 1300– 01. R
237. Id. at 1300.
238. The United States has not ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Id.
at 1300– 01.
239. GROENENDIJK ET AL., supra note 211, at 9; Parliament, 2006 E.C.R. ¶ 37 (“[T]he R
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is one of the international instru-
ments for the protection of human rights of which it takes account in applying the gen-
eral principles of Community law. That is also true of the Convention on the Rights of
the Child referred to above which, like the Covenant, binds each of the Member States.”)
(citations omitted). Parliament v. Council was the first case in which the ECJ explicitly
referenced the EU Charter of Fundamental rights. GROENENDIJK ET AL., supra note 211, at R
9.
240. See Parliament, 2006 E.C.R. ¶¶ 57, 88.
241. Nessel, supra note 206, at 1301. R
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United States and leave their child behind, or remain in their country of
origin and lose out on their American dream in the United States. . . .
[L]awful permanent residents who already live in the United States . . . must
make the difficult choice of either sending their child who has “aged-out” of
visa eligibility back to their country of origin, or have the child stay in the
United States out-of-status, in violation of our immigration laws, and thus,
vulnerable to deportation.  No law should encourage this course of
action.242
The purpose of the CSPA, therefore, was to prevent immigrant parents from
facing the heartbreaking dilemma of having to choose between a life with
their children and a life in the United States.  The only way for the Supreme
Court to ensure that this purpose is achieved is by adopting the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits’ interpretation of the CSPA.  Under this interpretation,
derivative beneficiaries of all family preference categories will be able to
retain the original priority date from their parent’s visa petition even after
they age out of derivative beneficiary status.  If the Court were to adopt the
Second Circuit’s interpretation, only derivative beneficiaries of certain
preference categories would be entitled to this benefit, and as a result, the
families of beneficiaries of the remaining preference categories would be
faced with the unfortunate dilemma discussed above.
Not only would adopting the Second Circuit’s interpretation go
against congressional intent, but also it would lead to absurd results.  With
both DACA and the Second Circuit’s interpretation in place, potential
immigrants from countries with extensive backlogs will be discouraged
from listing their children as derivative beneficiaries on certain visa peti-
tions.  Instead, they will be encouraged to obtain LPR status for themselves
and to bring their young children to the United States illegally, because
doing so will allow the family to remain together and ensure at least tempo-
rary legal residency for the children under DACA.  To avoid this absurd
result, the Supreme Court should not apply the statutory language in the
manner prescribed by the Second Circuit.
The Supreme Court can resolve the current circuit split in this way
because the unambiguous nature of the CSPA enables it to disregard the
BIA’s decision in Matter of Wang under a Chevron analysis.  In the case of
the CSPA, Congress’s intent— to fill the gap left by the INA regarding what
happens to derivative beneficiaries after they age out— is clear when the
subsections of the statute are read as a whole.  In addition, the plain lan-
guage of subsection (h)(3) clearly states that priority date retention will
apply for beneficiaries of any of the petitions described in subsection
(h)(2), which includes petitions of all family preference categories.
If family reunification is truly a cornerstone of U.S. immigration pol-
icy, the Supreme Court must affirm the Ninth Circuit’s decision in De
Osorio v. Mayorkas.  If it does not, immigrants to this country will be faced
with increased uncertainty and unfairness stemming from a disjointed fed-
eral system.  But potential immigrants should not be the only ones con-
cerned with promoting consistency in the enforcement of immigration
242. 147 CONG. REC. 5239 (2001) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein).
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laws in U.S. courts; the Supreme Court should have an interest in consis-
tent immigration enforcement as well.  Unlike the Court of Justice in the
EU, the U.S. Supreme Court has limited tools of international law upon
which to base its interpretations of domestic legislation.243  Instead, it is
up to Congress to clearly articulate the aims of the policies it proposes and
the procedures by which to implement such policies so that the Supreme
Court may properly interpret them.  When it comes to the CSPA, Congress
has spoken clearly.
243. Nessel, supra note 206, at 1300– 01. R
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